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Abstract. Defeasible logic is an efficient logic for defeasible reasoning.
It is defined through a proof theory and, until now, has had no model
theory. In this paper a model-theoretic semantics is given for defeasible
logic. The logic is sound and complete with respect to the semantics.
We also briefly outline how this approach extends to a wide range of
defeasible logics.
1 Introduction
Defeasible logic is a logic designed for efficient defeasible reasoning. The logic
was designed by Nute [23,24] with the intention that it be efficiently imple-
mentable. This intention has been realised in systems that can process hundreds
of thousands of defeasible rules quickly [21]. Over the years, Nute and others
have proposed many variants of defeasible logic [24,2]. In this paper we will ad-
dress a particular defeasible logic, which we denote by DL [5,1]. However, this
work is easily modified to address other defeasible logics.
Defeasible logics are, in general, paraconsistent. The nature of defeasible rea-
soning, where one chain of reasoning may defeat another, predisposes the logics
to avoid inconsistent inferences, and provides for a natural treatment of incon-
sistencies, when they occur. In the case of DL, which supports only sceptical
reasoning, inconsistent inferences are almost completely avoided. They only oc-
cur as a result of inconsistencies in the definite knowledge expressed by a theory.
When such inconsistencies occur, the inconsistent literals may be used individ-
ually – or even together – in further inferences, but no form of ex falso quodlibet
reasoning is possible.
DL, and similar logics, have been proposed as the appropriate language for
executable regulations [4], negotiations [10], contracts [26], and business rules
[14]. The logics are considered to have satisfactory expressiveness and the effi-
ciency of the implementations supports real-time response in applications such
⋆ Originally published in proc. PCL 2002, a FLoC workshop; eds. Hendrik Decker, Dina
Goldin, Jørgen Villadsen, Toshiharu Waragai (http://floc02.diku.dk/PCL/).
2 Michael J. Maher
as electronic commerce [14,11]. Indeed, propositional DL has been shown to have
linear time complexity [19].
On the other hand, neither DL nor any other variant of modern defeasible
logic has a model theory. DL is defined purely in proof-theoretic terms [24,5].
Furthermore, a model theory based on the idea of extensions (such as is used
for default logic) is likely to be inappropriate for defeasible logic, since the kind
of scepticism that is developed from intersection of extensions in default logic is
different from the kind of “direct” scepticism [15] that occurs in defeasible logic
[27].
In early work on semantics for defeasible logics, Nute [23] defined a model
theory for LDR, a substantially simpler precursor of DL, in terms of a mini-
mal belief state for each theory. LDR defines defeat only in terms of definite
provability; this limitation is the main reason why the approach is successful
[23]. Recently, this approach has been extended [8,25] to a defeasible logic that
is closer to DL, and more general in some respects. However, the semantics is
based on the idea of intersection of extensions and – perhaps consequently – the
logic is sound but not complete for this semantics.
Although there is not a model theory for defeasible logic, there has been
work on providing a semantics for DL in other styles. In [20] we showed that
DL can be defined in terms of a metaprogram, defined to reflect the inference
rules of the logic, and a semantics for the language of the metaprogram. This
approach was successful in establishing a relationship between DL and Kunen’s
semantics of negation-as-failure. Although it did not directly address model-
theoretic reasoning, we will use this semantics as a key intermediate step in
verifying the correctness of our model-theoretic semantics.
We have described DL and its variants in argumentation-theoretic terms
[12,13]. Such a characterization is useful for the applications of the logic that
we have in mind, but the resulting semantics is again a meta-level treatment of
the proof theory: proof trees are grouped together as arguments, and conflict-
ing arguments are resolved by notions of argument defeat that reflect defeat in
defeasible logic. Thus this work also fails to address model theory.
Finally, a denotational-style semantics [28] has been given to DL [18]. The
semantics is compositional, and fully abstract in all but one syntactic class.
Although this semantics provides a useful analysis of DL, it does not provide a
model theory.
In this paper, we define a model-theoretic semantics for DL. This seman-
tics follows Nute’s semantics for LDR in that models represent a state of mind
or “belief state” in which definite knowledge (that which is “known”) is distin-
guished from defeasible knowledge (that which is “believed”). A major difference
from [23] is that it adopts partial models as the basis from which to work. The
approach can be adapted easily to a wide range of defeasible logics.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we introduce the
constructs of defeasible logic, and the proof theory of DL. We then introduce
the model-theoretic semantics and prove the soundness and completeness of the
proof system with respect to this semantics. Finally, we discuss the extension
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of this work to other defeasible logics, including logics which admit pre-defined
relations – constraints in the sense of constraint logic programming [16].
2 The Defeasible Logic DL
We begin by presenting the basic ingredients of defeasible logic. A defeasible
theory contains five different kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules, defeasible
rules, defeaters, and a superiority relation.
Facts are indisputable statements, for example, “Tweety is an emu”. This
might be expressed as emu(tweety).
Strict rules are rules in the traditional sense: whenever the premises are
indisputable (e.g. facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is
“Emus are birds”. Written formally:
emu(X)→ bird(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example
of such a rule is “Birds typically fly”; written formally:
bird(X)⇒ flies(X)
The idea is that if we know that something is a bird, then we may conclude that
it flies, unless there is other evidence suggesting that it may not fly.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only
use is to prevent some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some
defeasible rules by producing evidence to the contrary. An example is “If an
animal is heavy then it might not be able to fly”. Formally:
heavy(X)❀ ¬flies(X)
The main point is that the information that an animal is heavy is not sufficient
evidence to conclude that it doesn’t fly. It is only evidence that the animal may
not be able to fly. In other words, we don’t wish to conclude ¬flies(tweety) if
heavy(tweety), we simply want to prevent a conclusion flies(tweety).
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules,
that is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example,
given the defeasible rules
r : bird(X)⇒ flies(X)
r′ : brokenWing(X)⇒ ¬flies(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether
a bird with a broken wing can fly. But if we introduce a superiority relation >
with r′ > r, then we can indeed conclude that the bird cannot fly. We assume
that > is acyclic. It turns out that we only need to define the superiority relation
over rules with contradictory conclusions.
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We now turn to a formal description of the language of defeasible logic and
the inference rules of the defeasible logic DL.
We assume a signature Σ containing predefined function and predicate sym-
bols, including =, with their arities. Initially, we will assume that it contains
only constants and =. Later we will consider the full generality of Σ. We also
assume a signature Π containing the set of predicate symbols, with their arities,
that are defined by a defeasible theory.
An atom has the form p(t1, . . . , tn) where p ∈ Π has arity n and t1, . . . , tn
are terms. A literal has the form a or ¬a, where a is an atom.
A rule r consists of an optional label, an antecedent (or body) A(r) which is
a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its head, which is a literal. Given a set R
of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs, the set of strict and
defeasible rules in R by Rsd , the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd, and the set
of defeaters in R by Rdft . R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with head q. If q is a
literal,∼q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then∼q
is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then∼q is p).
A defeasible theory T is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a finite set of literals
(called facts), R a finite set of rules, and > a superiority relation on the labels
of R.
Example 1. We will use the following defeasible theory to demonstrate some
elements of defeasible logic. We assume there are only the constants ethel and
tweety in the language. Let Tbird = (Fbird , Rbird , >bird) where: Fbird is the set of
facts
emu(ethel).
bird(tweety).
Rbird is represented by the set of rule schemas
r1 : emu(X)→ bird(X).
r2 : bird(X)⇒ flies(X).
r3 : heavy(X)❀ ¬flies(X).
r4 : brokenWing(X)⇒ ¬flies(X).
r5 : ⇒ heavy(ethel).
and the superiority relation >bird contains only r4 >bird r2.
The five rule schemas give rise to nine propositional rules by instantiating
each variable to ethel and tweety respectively. Those rules, which make up Rbird
are
r1,e : emu(ethel )→ bird(ethel).
r1,t : emu(tweety)→ bird(tweety).
r2,e : bird(ethel )⇒ flies(ethel).
r2,t : bird(tweety)⇒ flies(tweety).
r3,e : heavy(ethel )❀ ¬flies(ethel).
r3,t : heavy(tweety)❀ ¬flies(tweety).
r4,e : brokenWing(ethel )⇒ ¬flies(ethel).
r4,t : brokenWing(tweety)⇒ ¬flies(tweety).
r5 : ⇒ heavy(ethel ).
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The rules have been re-labelled purely to simplify later reference1. As a re-
sult, the superiority relation becomes {r4,e >bird r2,e, r4,e >bird r2,t, r4,t >bird
r2,e, r4,t >bird r2,t}. As noted in earlier, the two statements r4,e >bird r2,t and
r4,t >bird r2,e have no effect, since they do not involve rules with conflicting
heads.
In this defeasible theory,Rs = {r1,e, r1,t} and Rd[¬flies(tweety)] = {r3,t, r4,t}.
A conclusion of T is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four
forms:
+∆q, which is intended to mean that the literal q is definitely provable in T
(i.e., using only facts and strict rules).
−∆q, which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not definitely
provable in T .
+∂q, which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in T .
−∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not defeasibly
provable in T .
Thus, conclusions are meta-theoretical statements about provability. They
do not appear in a defeasible theory. Notice the distinction between −, which is
used only to express failure-to-prove, and ¬, which expresses classical negation.
For example, −∆¬flies(tweety) means that it has been proved that the negated
proposition ¬flies(tweety) cannot be proved definitely in the defeasible theory.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in T = (F,R,>).
A derivation is a finite sequence P = (P (1), . . . P (n)) of conclusions constructed
by inference rules.
The preceding descriptions and definitions are common to many variants
of defeasible logic, although in some variants the limitation to four tags and
four forms of conclusion has been discarded [2]. The inference rules we present
below are specific to, and characterize, the defeasible logic DL. We follow the
presentation of Billington [5].
There are four inference rules for DL (corresponding to the four kinds of
conclusion) that specify how a derivation can be extended. The formulation of
these inference rules assumes a propositional defeasible theory. (P (1..i) denotes
the initial part of the sequence P of length i):
+∆: We may append P (i+ 1) = +∆q if either
q ∈ F or
∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P (1..i)
This means, to prove +∆q we need to establish a proof for q using facts and
strict rules only. This is a deduction in the classical sense. To prove −∆q it is
required to show that every attempt to prove +∆q fails in a finite time. Thus
the inference rule for −∆ is the constructive complement of the inference rule
for +∆ [20].
1 Without the re-labelling we would have different rules with the same label. This is
not a problem, formally, but might be confusing.
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−∆: We may append P (i+ 1) = −∆q if
q 6∈ F and
∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1..i)
From Tbird in Example 1 we can infer +∆emu(ethel ) (and +∆bird(tweety))
immediately, in a proof of length 1. Using r1,e and the second clause of the
inference rule, we can infer +∆bird(ethel ) in a proof of length 2. We can in-
fer −∆heavy(tweety) and −∆¬flies(tweety) immediately (among many others),
since in these cases Rs[q] is empty.
The inference rule for defeasible conclusions is complicated by the defeasible
nature of DL: opposing chains of reasoning must be taken into account.
+∂: We may append P (i+ 1) = +∂q if either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and t > s
Let us work through this inference rule. To show that q is provable defeasibly
we have two choices: (1) We show that q is already definitely provable; or (2) we
need to argue using the defeasible part of T as well. In particular, we require
that there must be a strict or defeasible rule with head q which can be applied
(2.1). But now we need to consider possible “attacks”, that is, reasoning chains
in support of∼q. To be more specific: to prove q defeasibly we must show that
∼q is not definitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we must consider the set of all
rules which are not known to be inapplicable and which have head ∼q (note
that here we consider defeaters, too, whereas they could not be used to support
the conclusion q; this is in line with the motivation of defeaters given earlier).
Essentially each such rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to be provable, each
such rule s must be counterattacked by a rule t with head q with the following
properties: (i) t must be applicable at this point, and (ii) t must be stronger than
s. Thus each attack on the conclusion q must be counterattacked by a stronger
rule.
From Tbird in Example 1 we can infer +∂bird(ethel) in a proof of length 3,
using part (1) of the +∂ inference rule. we can infer +∂bird(ethel ) in a proof of
length 3, using (1). Other applications of this inference rule first require appli-
cation of the inference rule −∂. This inference rule completes the definition of
the proof system of defeasible logic. It is a strong negation of the inference rule
+∂ [2].
−∂: We may append P (i+ 1) = −∂q if
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) +∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) or
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(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd [q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or t 6> s
To prove that q is not defeasibly provable, we must first establish that it is
not definitely provable. Then we must establish that it cannot be proven using
the defeasible part of the theory. There are three possibilities to achieve this:
either we have established that none of the (strict and defeasible) rules with
head q can be applied (2.1); or∼q is definitely provable (2.2); or there must be
an applicable rule s with head∼q such that no possibly applicable rule t with
head q is superior to s (2.3).
From Tbird in Example 1 we can infer −∂brokenWing(ethel ) with a proof of
length 2 using (1) and (2.1), since R[q] is empty. Employing this conclusion, we
can then infer −∂¬flies(ethel), again using (2.1), since the only rule r is r4,e.
Using r5, we can infer +∂heavy(ethel) by (2) of the inference rule +∂; (2.3)
holds since R[∼q] is empty. Using (2.3) of the inference rule −∂, we can infer
−∂flies(ethel), where the role of s is taken by r3,e.
Furthermore, we can infer −∂brokenWing(tweety) and −∂heavy(tweety) us-
ing (2.1) of inference rule −∂, since in both cases Rsd [q] is empty. Employing
those conclusions, we can then infer −∂¬flies(tweety), again using (2.1), since
the only rules for ¬flies(tweety) involve antecedents already established to be
unprovable defeasibly. Now, using this conclusion, we can use (2), specifically
(2.1), of the inference rule +∂ to infer +∂flies(tweety).
We write T ⊢ c, where T is a defeasible theory and c is a conclusion, if there
is a proof in T that ends with c. For example, Tbird ⊢ +∂flies(tweety).
It is clear that DL is a paraconsistent logic. If a defeasible theory T contains
facts a and ¬a and a rule b → b, then the inconsistency concerning a has no
effect on what is provable about b. When considering defeasible reasoning, a main
feature of defeasible logics is that potentially inconsistent inferences are avoided
either by use of the superiority relation or by simply failing to infer either of the
consequences, as in the previous discussion of a bird with a broken wing. Some
inconsistent defeasible inferences may be made, as consequences of inconsistent
definite inferences, but the logic displays the same kind of paraconsistency as
discussed above for definite reasoning.
3 A Model-Theoretic Semantics
A domain is a Σ-structure D that defines a set D of objects over which for-
mulas may be interpreted, and gives a meaning to all function symbols and
pre-defined predicate symbols as functions (respectively, relations) over D. =
is interpreted as identity on D. Given a domain D, the D-base of a language is
BD = {p(d1, . . . , dn),¬p(d1, . . . , dn) | n ≥ 0, p ∈ Π, p has arity n, di ∈ D for i =
1, 2, . . . , n}. We sometimes refer to elements of BD as interpreted literals.
The following definition introduces the notion of a defeasible interpretation.
It is formulated in a truth-functional manner to simplify later statements, but
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it might equally well be formulated without introducing truth, at the expense of
clumsier definitions later.
Definition 1. A defeasible interpretation I consists of a domain DI , and two
partial functions I∆ and I∂ which map BDI to {True,False}, which satisfy the
following conditions2:
∀q ∈ BDI I∆(q) = True → I∂(q) = True
and
∀q ∈ BDI I∂(q) = False → I∆(q) = False
A D-interpretation is a defeasible interpretation over the domain D.
Intuitively, I∆ specifies those evaluated literals that are known definitely
(map to True) or known not to be known definitely (map to False). Similarly,
I∂ specifies those evaluated literals that are believed defeasibly (map to True)
or known not to be defeasibly believed (map to False). Thus a defeasible inter-
pretation represents a state of mind in which some evaluated literals are known
or believed, while for others there is awareness that they are not known or be-
lieved, and still others have undefined status – neither known, nor unknown;
neither believed, nor unbelieved. We refer to the values of I∆ and I∂ on an
evaluated literal q as the epistemic status of q in I.
The two conditions on defeasible interpretations enforce that that which is
known is believed, and that which is not believed is not known. In other words,
they enforce the expected relationship between knowledge and belief.
The functions I∆ and I∂ are easily extended to conjunctions of evaluated
literals. The extension follows the same pattern for both functions, so we show
only I∆.
I∆(q1, . . . , qn) =
n∧
i=1
I∆(qi)
where the truth table for ∧ is
True False undefined
True True False undefined
False False False False
undefined undefined False undefined
Among the D-interpretations, we distinguish the D-models of a defeasible
theory T : thoseD-interpretations which are consistent with the rules of reasoning
specified by T and DL.
2 Actually these conditions need not be imposed: even if we did not impose them
on interpretations, all models of a defeasible theory satisfy these conditions. But we
prefer to explicitly require that interpretations respect this fundamental relationship
between definite and defeasible knowledge.
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Definition 2. A D-interpretation I is a D-model if it satisfies the following
four conditions. Let q range over elements of BD.
I∆(q) = True iff
q ∈ F or
∃r ∈ Rs[q] I∆(A(r)) = True
I∆(q) = False iff
q 6∈ F and
∀r ∈ Rs[q] I∆(A(r)) = False
I∂(q) = True iff
(1) I∆(q) = True or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] I∂(A(r)) = True and
(2.2) I∆(∼q) = False and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) I∂(A(s)) = False or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [q] such that
I∂(A(t)) = True and t > s
I∂(q) = False iff
(1) I∆(q) = False and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q] I∂(A(r)) = False or
(2.2) I∆(∼q) = True or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) I∂(A(s)) = True and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd [q] either
I∂(A(t)) = False or t 6> s
Clearly there is a close correspondence between these conditions and the
inference rules of DL. The four conditions are if-and-only-if statements. The “if”
part ensures that all models are deductively closed. The “only-if” part ensures
that models are abductively closed, in the following sense: if an evaluated literal
has some epistemic status in a model, then there is a reason, in the model, why
that status is given.
We must also represent the meaning of the symbols of Σ. We might simply
use a Σ-structure D for this purpose, but it turns out that, in general, models
based on the intended Σ-structure D do not characterize provability in DL.
Instead we will use the first-order theory of D, denoted Th(D). Thus we
will consider all domains that agree with D on first-order sentences. We write
Th(D), T |=DL c to denote that the conclusion c holds in all defeasible modelsM
of T such that DM is a model of Th(D) (in the conventional sense of first-order
logic). That is, if c is +∆q then M∆(q) = True, if c is −∆q then M∆(q) = False,
etc. We say that c is a defeasible logical consequence of T and Th(D).
Taking the defeasible models of Th(D), T as the semantics of the defeasible
theory T over D, it is straightforward to prove that the proof system is sound.
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Theorem 1. Let T be a defeasible theory over a domain D. Let c be a conclu-
sion.
If T ⊢ c then Th(D), T |=DL c
The proof is by induction on the length of proofs.
4 Completeness
We now establish the completeness of the inference rules with respect to these
models. We do this by establishing an intimate connection between D-models of
a defeasible theory T and partial models of a corresponding metaprogram. In
this section we only outline the proof, since there is not enough space to present
the requisite background material.
In [20] we developed a logic metaprogram M for DL. If T is a defeasible
theory, then MT is M augmented with a representation of T . It was shown
in [20] that the consequences of T are characterized by MT under Kunen’s
semantics for logic programs [17].
Theorem 2 ([20]). Let T be a defeasible theory and letMT denote its metapro-
gram counterpart. Let H be the Herbrand domain over which MT is defined.
For each literal p,
1. T ⊢ +∆p iff MT , Th(H) ⊢K definitely(p);
2. T ⊢ −∆p iff MT , Th(H) ⊢K ¬definitely(p);
3. T ⊢ +∂p iff MT , Th(H) ⊢K defeasibly(p);
4. T ⊢ −∂p iff MT , Th(H) ⊢K ¬defeasibly(p);
Kunen also characterized his semantics of logic programs in terms of 3-valued
models of the logic program. For any logic programP and literal q, Kunen showed
that P , Th(H) ⊢K q iff P , Th(H) |=K q [17], where |=K denotes the 3-valued
logical consequence relation.
The remaining step is to relate defeasible models of a defeasible theory T
with 3-valued models of MT . There is a technical difficulty: defeasible interpre-
tations of T involve domains with signature Σ, whereas the signature of domains
of MT extends Σ with function symbols corresponding to Π (and other, auxil-
iary function symbols). The problem arises because the metaprogram represents
predicates as functions.
We address this problem by defining, for every domain D over Σ, a do-
main extension D∗ over the extended signature. We are then able to relate D-
interpretations of T with 3-valued interpretations of MT over D
∗. Thus we
obtain
Proposition 1. Let T be a defeasible theory over signature Σ and let D be a
domain over this signature.
• MT , Th(D
∗) |=K definitely(q) iff T , Th(D) |=DL +∆q
• MT , Th(D
∗) |=K ¬definitely(q) iff T , Th(D) |=DL −∆q
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• MT , Th(D
∗) |=K defeasibly(q) iff T , Th(D) |=DL +∂q
• MT , Th(D
∗) |=K ¬defeasibly(q) iff T , Th(D) |=DL −∂q
Combining these three results together, the completeness (and soundness) of
the proof system for the model theory is established.
Theorem 3. Let T be a defeasible theory over signature Σ and let H be the
Herbrand domain over this signature. Let c be any conclusion.
T ⊢ c iff Th(H), T |=DL c
5 Other Defeasible Logics
The approach of this paper is more widely applicable than simply to DL. In the
following, we first look at the extension of this approach to a form of DL that is
not essentially propositional. We then discuss its application to other defeasible
logics that can be formulated within the flexible framework of [2]. We only have
space to outline this work.
5.1 Non-Propositional Defeasible Logic
The development of the model theory in terms of D and Th(D) is an overkill,
technically, for an essentially propositional logic, such as the presentation of DL
in Section 2. However, this development makes it easy to extend DL to a first-
order logic, and to extend it further with pre-defined functions and predicates –
constraints in the sense of constraint logic programming [16].
The only change to the model theory is that the restriction onΣ (to constants
and =) is removed, with consequent flow-on affects on D.
The proof system, as presented in Section 2, is inadequate to handle infinite
domains, if rules are regarded as schemas for propositional rules. However [20]
gives a bottom-up reformulation of the proof system that can handle infinite
domains, and is easily extended to address constraints.
With this reformulated proof system, the soundness and completeness con-
tinues to hold in the presence of constraints over infinite domains. There are
some elements of the proofs that must change. In particular, the metaprogram
M must now accommodate constraints and Theorem 2 must be extended. But
such changes are not difficult. The extension of Kunen’s result, equating ⊢K and
|=K , to arbitrary domains is due to Stuckey [29].
5.2 Variants of DL
As proposed in [2], the metaprogram presentation of DL can be generalized to a
framework for the definition of many different defeasible logics. [2] presents some
variants of DL with different proof-theoretic properties. Some of these variants
involve extra levels of belief, beyond definite and defeasible knowledge.
Since failure-to-prove in these variants is still characterized by Kunen’s se-
mantics, we can directly apply the techniques of this paper to establish a model
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theory and prove soundness and completeness of these variants. Technically, all
that is needed is a definition of model appropriate to the inference rules of the
logic and a corresponding metaprogram.
The framework of [2] admits other forms of failure-to-prove than Kunen’s se-
mantics. Any semantics for logic programs provides an alternate form of failure-
to-prove. Indeed, [20] showed that Well-Founded Defeasible Logic is character-
ized by metaprogram of Section 4 and the well-founded semantics of logic pro-
grams [30].
In the well-founded semantics – and many other semantics of logic programs
– the semantics rests on a single domain of values D. Thus, in these cases, the
introduction of Th(D) is unnecessary. In the case of Well-Founded Defeasible
Logic there is, essentially, a single model of a defeasible theory T over D, which
is the reduct of the well-founded (partial) model of MT . The defeasible logic
investigated in [8,25] performs loop-checking to detect failure-to-prove, which
makes failure-to-prove in that logic similar to well-founded semantics. This sug-
gests that a model-theoretic semantics for which that logic is sound and com-
plete might be established by following the pattern of this paper, but using the
well-founded semantics in place of Kunen’s semantics and using a substantially
different metaprogram.
Other semantics, such as the stable model semantics [9], give rise to several
D-models for a defeasible theory in the corresponding defeasible logic.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced an approach to defining an appropriate model theory for
defeasible logics. The approach was demonstrated in detail for the logic DL, and
we outlined how it can be applied to a wide range of defeasible logics.
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